A shared API key is not an identity.
Most “agent auth” today is a long-lived API key pasted into an agent's config file. No user is tied to it, no consent was ever captured, and revoking it breaks every workflow that shares it - not just the one you meant to stop.
When an agent takes an action for a real customer, that action deserves the same trail a human login gets: who authorized it, exactly what it was allowed to do, and a way to revoke it without collateral damage.
Security and IAM teams typically have no inventory of which agents are calling which internal APIs on whose behalf - until an incident forces them to reconstruct it after the fact.
OIDC login, then token exchange, then a scoped token per application.
Registration, consent, delegation, approval, and a kill switch.
Agent registration & inventory
Register an agent once; it appears in your inventory the moment it makes its first real connection, not before.
Consent grants, admin and self-service
Users see exactly what they've authorized, per application, and can revoke it themselves; admins can do the same workspace-wide.
Cross-app delegation via ID-JAG
Agents act through a real delegation token descended from a user login, not a shared static key.
Connection approval workflow
Every new agent → Application pairing starts pending and is approved with a specific role; connections are individually revocable.
Trust Delegation guardrails
Set a ceiling - maximum role, maximum permissions, maximum token lifetime - on what can ever be delegated under a given client, before any delegation happens.
Discovered Agents
Passively finds agents and workloads already running in your infrastructure that nobody registered; claim an owner or quarantine them from a governance queue.
Built-in debugging
A dry-run simulator answers “would this token even mint, and why not.” A cross-app checker explains why an agent can't reach an Application, with a shareable failure bundle.
Voice agents
IN PROGRESSA CIBA-based push-approval pattern for phone and voice-driven agents, sharing the same MFA device infrastructure as human end users.
Wiring an AI agent into a customer-facing product without building a second identity system just for agents.
Who need an inventory of every agent, what it can reach, and a per-agent kill switch.
Who need proof that every agent action traces to a real user's consent, with revocation history intact.
Not “issue the agent an API key and hope.” Not a bespoke agent-identity system bolted on beside your real user base.
The agent rides the exact same OIDC and consent rails your customers already use - so there's no second identity system to secure, audit, or explain to a compliance reviewer.
What these words mean here.
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